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1. Introduction
In the years 1973–2009, global production of natural
gas has grown by 267% [1]. Increasing demand has led
to subsequent regional increases in import prices over
the years, with the average EU import price for LNG
nearly doubling from $3.42/GJ in 2003 to $6.49/GJ in
2010, after experiencing a peak average of $8.70/GJ in
2008. It is worth noting that import prices vary
significantly across different regions. During the same
period, the cost of LNG in the United States rose from
$4.45/GJ in 2003 to $9.33/GJ in 2008 and then
decreased to $4.54/GJ in 2010 [2]. Prices in the United
States have decreased due to increased production of
unconventional gas, which reduced demand for imports
[3]. Furthermore, demand growth rates are different in
each region. In the New Policies Scenario of the
International Energy Agency (IEA), between 2010 and
2035 natural gas demand is projected to grow annually
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by 0.5% and 0.6% in the US and EU respectively, while
at the same time growth rates will reach 4.2% in India
and 6.6% in China [4]. Despite increasing gas demand
and the vast availability of gas reserves worldwide,
construction of infrastructure for production and
transportation is both complex and demanding in terms
of funds and time, thus limiting the exploitation rate of
recoverable gas resources [3].
With the global demand for energy increasing, as
further discoveries of fossil fuel reserves are made,
strategies will be required to ensure an efficient and
economically optimum use of these resources. In this
paper the authors address the case of two Eastern
Mediterranean countries, Israel and Cyprus, which
appear to have, relative to their size, significant offshore
natural gas reserves available for exploitation. Despite
ongoing natural gas extraction, Israel’s energy sector
imports significant volumes of gas and coal, while
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A B S T R A C T
The global production of natural gas has increased from 1226 bcm in 1973 to 3282 bcm in 2010
and is projected to continue rising by an annual growth rate of 1.6% between 2010 to 2035.
Cyprus and Israel have recently made major offshore discoveries of natural gas, which can supply
to a great extent the two countries’ current domestic energy needs for the next few decades and
still export a substantial volume. MESSAGE, a global optimization model was used to explore
the possible interactions between the two countries’ energy systems. Scenarios are presented that
assess the export potential for electricity (generated by gas-fired power plants), liquefied natural
gas (LNG) or gas-to-liquid products (GTL). The results are compared to a scenario without any
available reserves to illustrate the financial benefits that will arise from the exploitation of the gas
resources in the two countries.
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Cyprus relies almost entirely on imports; thus these two
countries are interesting case studies. At the same time,
the proximity of these reserves to continental Europe
and the fact that they are quite extensive can have an
effect on the energy security of the European Union,
which seeks to exploit indigenous resources and
promote diversification of supply. In existing literature
the Israeli gas finds have been presented from a political
perspective [5], but despite the estimated volume of gas
discovered, there is a knowledge gap in regards to the
quantitative assessment of the future development
potential of these resources; the same applies for the
case of Cyprus. This paper aims to conduct such a
quantitative analysis in terms of power generation and
gas export capabilities of the two countries under a
range of scenarios. In light of the financial crisis that has
recently hit hard the island of Cyprus, we present results
of analysis of how these reserves may affect the power
generation system of both countries over the coming
decades and whether there is any grave prospect for
exports.
The first section of this paper provides an
introduction to the present energy sector of Israel and
Cyprus and elaborates on the significance of this study.
In Section 2 the methodology followed in this work and
the software used are briefly described, while the
scenarios formulated for analysis of the power
generation systems and export potential of the two
countries are defined. The main results from this
analytical work are presented and discussed upon in
Section 3. The paper concludes with a recollection of the
main findings in Section 4.
1.1. Current energy status
In this section a brief overview of the current status of
the energy sector in Israel and Cyprus is given, in an
effort to indicate how significant these reserves will be
to the two countries. Even though Israel had made small
onshore discoveries of oil and natural gas in the 1950s,
the most significant discoveries started in 1999, when
natural gas reserves were discovered offshore. Natural
gas production started in 2004, with most of it being
used by a portion of the country’s power plants, which
were adjusted to use gas instead of oil as feedstock.
Since then, a few major discoveries have been made
offshore, with the most important ones being the Tamar
field, which holds about 240 billion m3, and the
Leviathan field, with an estimated reserve of 450 billion
m3 of gas [6].
The natural gas extracted in Israel is primarily
consumed by domestic power plants. Of the
approximately 205 PJ of natural gas consumed in 2010,
5.5 PJ were used as fuel in oil refineries, 3 PJ in industry
and the rest was used for power generation [7]. Due to
the fact that the extraction of the domestic reserves is
still at an early stage, until 2010 it was not yet sufficient
to cover the nation’s natural gas needs. In 2010 the share
of fuels for electricity generation was 61% for coal,
36.6% for natural gas, 1.5% for diesel oil and 0.9% for
fuel oil. With the exception of natural gas, Israel
primarily relies on imports for its energy requirements.
In 2010 56% of the natural gas used by the Israel
Electric Corporation (IEC) was domestic, while the rest
was imported from Egypt via a marine pipeline. Coal is
imported from Africa, South America, Asia and
Australia [8].
In contrast to Israel, Cyprus has made very few steps
so far regarding natural gas exploitation. The first
exploratory well started in autumn of 2011 in one of the
13 blocks (no. 12 named Aphrodite) available for
exploration [9]. The reserve in this area is estimated to
hold about 140 to 225 billion m3 of gas [10]. During the
second licensing round for exploration, Cyprus has
decided to start negotiations for gas licenses of four
other offshore blocks with Italian company Eni, Russian
Novatek, French Total and South Korean KoGas [11].
It should be clarified that natural gas is not used as
fuel in any of the sectors of the Cypriot economy [12].
In regards to power generation, Cyprus at present meets
its demand almost entirely through imported oil.
Currently, there are no grid connections going to and
from the island, so it cannot trade electricity with
surrounding countries. It was estimated that during the
years 2011–2012, renewable energy sources would
correspond to 4% of the electricity generation of Cyprus
[13]. The rest of the electricity would be generated from
fossil-fuelled power plants, the vast majority of which
burn heavy fuel oil and to a lesser extent diesel [14]. All
of the fossil fuels used on the island are being imported.
The cooperation of Israel and Cyprus along with
Greece in the field of energy has been illustrated by the
announcement of the future deployment of an undersea
electricity cable. This will have a capacity of 2 GW and
an estimated investment cost of approximately $2
billion. This linkage will connect Israel to Cyprus and
then Greece [15], so as to allow sales of excess
electricity from Israeli and Cypriot gas-fired plants to
continental Europe. Moreover, there are thoughts of
jointly developing an LNG terminal in the south coast of
Cyprus, where natural gas from both countries could be
processed before being shipped for export [16].
The energy systems of the two countries are presently
independent of each other and were selected for analysis
as they both have been, at least until recently, relying
almost entirely on imports in order to meet their
demand, while now they have a chance to transform into
energy providers. It was hypothesized that these systems
would largely transform when natural gas was
introduced, taking into consideration that gas will be
domestically produced in immense volumes.
Nonetheless, exploitation of this gas would necessitate
high-level political decisions, market accessibility,
investments in infrastructure and technical expertise [3];
not only to supply the internal market, but also to export
a substantial amount of the extracted resources.
In view of the fact that Israel and Cyprus have been
heavily dependent on energy imports, analysis of
scenarios in which these two countries have access to
domestic resources becomes intriguing from a
geopolitical viewpoint. As discussed above, experience
in gas markets is low for Cyprus and to a certain extent
for Israel, thus an assessment of possible development
pathways is required to allow informed decision-
making. Depending on the extent of available reserves,
these two countries could emerge as important suppliers
of natural gas and to a certain extent compete with major
producers, such as Russia and the neighboring Middle
Eastern nations. Therefore, it is vital to adequately
assess the potential volume of exports that will become
available, taking into consideration the domestic energy
needs. The following section of this paper describes the
approach followed to achieve this.
2. Material and methods
Quantitative analysis of the power generation systems
of Cyprus and Israel was conducted through the
construction of the existing power systems and
formulation of scenarios to project and assess
alternative pathways to energy system development.
The modeling work was carried out using MESSAGE
(Model for Energy Supply Strategy Alternatives and
their General Environmental impacts), which was
initially designed by the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and subsequently
further enhanced jointly with the International Atomic
Energy Agency [17].
National and regional energy systems can be modeled
and optimized in MESSAGE. It does this by selecting
the most economical solution out of a variety of
alternatives provided by the analyst. Technologies and
energy sources can be linked along ‘energy chains’, thus
enabling the user to construct a model from resource
extraction to final energy demand. A set of constraints is
added to investigate different scenarios or to simulate
‘real life’ attributes of the modeled system. These
constraints may include limitations on new investment,
environmental regulations, fuel availability and trade
[17]. A reference energy system was developed for the
two countries (Annex A) and was then modeled in
MESSAGE. Detailed technology input data and
assumptions used in the model are shown in Annex B.
2.1. Scenarios
In order to investigate how the two countries’ systems
will respond under different conditions, a variety of
scenarios was selected for assessment. In the baseline
scenario, the conditions that currently apply for both
countries, as well as the most likely courses of actions,
were modeled. Based on the last year with a
comprehensive data-set, 2010 was used as the initial
year of model simulations. The natural gas reserves
discovered so far were added to the model,
corresponding to approximately 7 trillion cubic feet for
Cyprus [10] and 28 trillion cubic feet for Israel [6].
Major development projects, such as the construction of
the electricity cable for sales to Europe and a
liquefaction plant for sales of LNG were added, and
projections were made to 2050. The model was allowed
to invest in an LNG terminal in both countries, even
though in reality a joint plant may be built in one of the
countries. It should be noted that the projections of final
electricity demand of the two countries were made either
based on trends in the past decade for Israel [18] or
based on projections for the following decade for
Cyprus [19]. Current average prices of gas and
electricity were used to set export prices in the analysis;
$9/GJ for LNG, assuming sales to Europe, and
120$/MWh for electricity, assuming sales to Greece [2].
The formulation of scenarios aimed at assisting
potential decisions that would be required by policy-
makers in the two countries. It was clear that the
dilemma between using the available natural gas for
the sale of electricity, LNG or GTL products should be
focused on. Therefore, the chosen scenarios were the
following:
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1. The prospect of an additional cable to sell
electricity to Europe.
2. Increasing exported LNG prices compared to
stable electricity prices.
3. Increasing exported electricity prices compared
to stable LNG prices.
4. The potential of converting natural gas to
petrochemical products for export purposes.
Scenarios 1–3 investigate the conditions under which
it is economically preferable to export LNG rather than
electricity and vice versa, whereas scenario 4 examines
the viability of GTL production when the price of oil is
considerably higher than that of natural gas. In order to
assess the selected scenarios, the appropriate variables,
which would be changed in each case, were identified.
These variables along with the fluctuating values are
shown in Table 1.
3. Results and discussion
In this section, the most representative results were
chosen to help reach constructive conclusions. It should
be highlighted that all the results are based on the
approximate volumes of gas that have already been
found in the two countries and does not include reserves
that are not yet proven.
3.1. Baseline scenario
3.1.1. Local production
Power generation in Cyprus changes drastically with the
incorporation of natural gas as an energy source. Gas is
allowed to enter the fuel mix in 2015 and over a short
amount of time it completely replaces oil as the primary
fuel for electricity generation. As shown in Figure 1,
most of the electricity generation after 2015 relies on
natural gas. The stepwise development of new gas-fired
power plants, observed in the first few years, is due to
limitations added on the rate of introduction of new
technologies, so as to simulate real world conditions.
The big increase of electricity generation observed in
the period 2022–2044 can be attributed to electricity
sales to Europe. Immediately after extraction
commences, which in our model is assumed to be in
2015, a portion of the gas is sold as LNG while the
remainder is used to meet electricity demand in the
island (Figure 2). The assumption is, however, that – if
economic - a liquefaction plant could be built in the
years prior to 2015, so it can be utilized as soon as
natural gas becomes available; this is the case for Israel
as well.
The situation in Israel seems to be different from
Cyprus, in that coal is not completely substituted by
natural gas. As can be seen in Figure 1, during the first
two decades there is an increase in the share of natural
gas, but as the reserves diminish, coal returns as the
dominant energy source. In 2043, the last of proven
reserves run out, so there is dependency on imports of
natural gas once again.
Perhaps one of the most interesting results from Israel
is the fact that even though there is plentiful supply of
natural gas to cover domestic needs, it seems preferable
to export LNG and use cheap coal to cover the internal
power demand. However, unlike Cyprus, Israel
completely runs out of natural gas in 2043 and switches
back to the cheap alternative of coal for power
generation. It should be mentioned that a gas import
limitation of about 44 000 GWh was placed on Israel,
which is approximately double the amount imported in
2010 [6]; this is an attempt to limit to a certain extent
import dependency.
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Table 1: Adjustments to model variables for scenario evaluation.
Aspect or variable changed relative
Related scenario Description to baseline scenario
1 Second electricity cable to Europe Additional cable of 2000 MW to be built in 2020
2 Higher LNG prices - stable electricity prices Price of LNG ($/kWyr)
9 a +25% +50% +100% +150% 
(355) (426) (568) (710)
3 Higher electricity prices - stable LNG prices Price of exported electricity ($/kWyr)
120 b +25% +50% +100% +150% 
(1319) (1583) (2110) (2638)
4 Petrochemical production Gas-to-liquids production for export purposes
a Used EU average for LNG import prices into Europe in USD/GJ for summer 2011 [2].
b Used Greece end-use Electricity prices for industry in USD/MWh for 2Q2011 [2].
3.1.2. Exports
The discovery of natural gas in the Eastern
Mediterranean in a time of economic crisis was well
received by the implicated governments. This optimism
stems from the prospect of acquiring revenue via exports
of LNG and, to a lesser extent, electricity. Figure 3
shows the possible extent of these exports in the baseline
scenario, which indicates that based on current prices, it
is more profitable to sell LNG rather than electricity.
The results suggest that, in relation to the total exported
natural gas, both countries will sell a relatively small
portion of electricity to Europe. At the beginning of the
projection period, Israel makes nearly full use of the
cable’s capacity to export electricity, but then Cyprus
also partially contributes, up to a point where Israel
stops and Cyprus makes use of about 35–40% of the
cable’s capacity.
3.1.3. Cost comparison
An economic comparison was done between the
baseline scenario and a scenario in which no gas
reserves are available to either of the two countries.
Figure 4 shows the annual cost of the energy systems in
each country for these two scenarios, calculated based
on the following equation:
Cost = Infrastructure investment costs (power plants,
transmission system, LNG terminal, GTL
plant) + operation & maintenance costs + fuel
costs + Import costs – Export revenue.
In essence, this estimates the total system cost, taking
into account potential revenue from exports, excluding
however any revenue from sales of electricity
domestically. In Figure 4a, the higher the line is on the
graph, the costlier the system is, so it can be concluded
at a first glance that the system is less costly to run when
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Figure 1: Projected electricity generation in Cyprus (left) and Israel (right) over the modeled period.
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Figure 2: Fate of natural gas reserves from Cyprus (left) and Israel (right).
gas reserves are available. The peaks observed are large
investments, such as the construction of the LNG
terminal in 2015. During the entire projection period, the
discounted cost savings of both systems amounts to 24
billion USD (Figure 4b).
It is worth noting that from these results, it appears
that Israel is profiting significantly more than Cyprus.
Of course, this can be attributed to the fact that in the
model used, Israel’s natural gas reserves are four times
larger than of Cyprus and consequently is able to export
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Figure 3: Exports of electricity and LNG from Cyprus and Israel.
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Figure 4: (a) Costs of the energy system of the two countries over the projected period in the baseline scenario and the “No Gas Reserves”
scenario, and (b) cost savings achieved when exploiting gas reserves in the baseline scenario, in billion USD.
more gas; the proven reserves are expected to increase
for both countries in the future. However, since the
liquefaction facilities are likely to be built in Cyprus
[15], in reality it remains to be seen what kind of
agreement will be reached by the two countries. It is
possible that Cyprus may be able to raise its profits
based on revenue sharing agreements and through the
use of transport tariffs.
3.2. Assessment of selected scenarios
3.2.1. The choice between exported electricity
and LNG
In this sub-section, the results from scenarios 1–3 (Table
1) are evaluated to identify the circumstances under
which electricity as an export product becomes more
attractive than LNG and vice versa. Detailed results
regarding exports and fate of extracted natural gas are
provided in Annex C. As discussed, based on the current
commodity prices, it seems more profitable for the two
countries to sell LNG rather than electricity, as the cable’s
capacity is not used to its full extent for the majority of the
period. When the capacity of the cable is allowed to
double in the first assessment scenario, the amount of
electricity sold to Europe from Cyprus doubles as well.
However, the corresponding amount from Israel shows an
increase of 38%. This means that the cable’s capacity is
not fully utilized, which is an indication that on balance
LNG is more profitable at the assumed prices.
In scenario 2, it is interesting to see that as the price
of LNG is increased, even by 25%, Cyprus completely
shuts down its electricity exports and diverts that
amount of natural gas, as well as some natural gas
previously used for its own power generation, into LNG
sales. Additionally, Cyprus chooses to import minor
amounts of electricity from Israel as the price of LNG
increases. This suggests that it seems preferable for the
Cyprus system to sell its natural gas as LNG and cover
those minute needs by imports. Evidently, as the price of
LNG is increased further, Israel is more reluctant to sell
electricity and also prefers to export LNG. Due to the
fact that LNG prices vary significantly per region [2], it
could be argued that it may be preferable for the two
countries to sell LNG to Asian countries rather than
Europe, as the prices there are higher.
On the other hand, once the price of electricity is
increased in scenario 3, the outlook of exports changes
to a considerable extent. Even with the smallest increase
of 25%, Cyprus decreases LNG exports by 33% and
more than doubles its electricity exports, when
compared to the baseline scenario. The Israeli system in
this case behaves very differently. It reduces both its
LNG and electricity exports, but increases electricity
generated from natural gas for internal purposes, thus
reducing combustion of coal. This can be explained by
the fact that since it is now more profitable to sell
electricity, the Cyprus system likes to do exactly that,
thus taking over the majority of the cable’s capacity
between the years 2022–2043 (Figure 5). Since the
transmission losses from Cyprus to Europe are lower
than those from Israel-to-Cyprus-to-Europe, MESSAGE
recognizes that it is preferable for the system as a whole
to sell electricity from Cyprus rather than Israel.
Nevertheless, as the price of electricity increases, the
amount of electricity exported by Israel also increases
and reaches higher amounts than the baseline scenario,
once the price is doubled. It can be concluded from the
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Figure 5: Exports in the scenario of higher electricity prices by 25%.
results of scenario 3 that if the price of LNG is reduced
or if the price of electricity is increased, the two
countries may have to compete for the right to sell their
electricity to Europe via a common electricity link.
3.2.2. The prospect of petrochemical
production
The following sub-section addresses the findings of
scenario 4. As a result of the price difference between
natural gas and oil products in the global market [20]
and the discovery of gas reserves in areas away from
demand, the possibility of converting natural gas into
more transferable and competitive products has been
gaining substantial attention [21]. Gas-to-liquids (GTL)
plants have been in operation for several decades and
under the right conditions have proven their commercial
viability [22, 23]. The largest plant currently in
operation was constructed in Qatar by Shell, and
produces 140 thousand barrels of GTL products per day,
among which are 120 thousand barrels of oil of natural
gas liquids and ethane [24].
The interest in GTL production has been increasing in
various areas of the world [25, 26]. In this scenario, the
option of developing GTL plants in Cyprus and Israel was
investigated. A plant with a small capacity of 17 thousand
bbl/day was added to the system for each of the countries,
an export price of $107.25/bbl was set and the model was
run. Further assumptions regarding the specifications of
the GTL plants can be found in Appendix B.
Model results of this scenario indicate that GTL
production can be viable. In Figure 6, the fate of
extracted natural gas in each of the countries can be
seen. It has to be highlighted that in both cases the
amount of natural gas converted to petrochemical
products is equal to the maximum allowed quantity set
in the model for the entire time of operation; 22 years in
Cyprus and 20 years in Israel, which is shorter than the
defined lifetime of the petrochemical plants set at 30
years. In this scenario, the total discounted system cost
savings amount to 29 billion USD; 5 more than in the
baseline scenario. This is an indication, based on the
price assumptions adopted, that petrochemical
production is more profitable.
As indicated by Figure 6, even though in this scenario
GTL products are being exported, the majority of
exports from the two countries is still LNG, due to the
limitation placed on petrochemical production.
However, there are a few important aspects that need
careful consideration before deciding to invest in
liquefaction or GTL plants. First of all, space could be
an issue, especially in the case of Cyprus, a small island
whose economy currently relies to a great extent on
tourism. The construction of projects of such magnitude
will most likely occur along the coast due to shipping.
Since there are already questions about the location of
the proposed LNG plant in Cyprus [27], finding a
location for an additional GTL plant might offer some
difficulty.
Secondly, security is another important issue and
since the Eastern Mediterranean and the greater Middle
East is a politically volatile region, costs for guarding
facilities of huge significance could be quite high and
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Figure 6: Fate of natural gas (GWh) for each year in Cyprus (left) and Israel (right).
having to protect two such locations undeniably raises
overall expenses. Lastly, but perhaps most importantly,
price fluctuations of oil and natural gas could affect
GTL economic viability in the future. When the price
gap between the two commodities is larger, the
incentives for investment in GTL projects increase [20],
which is the case with current prices. However, if prices
for natural gas start to increase at a much faster pace
than for oil, it will make more sense to invest in
liquefaction plants and simply export LNG. Hence, the
risk is rather high, thus the responsible authorities of the
two countries should carefully assess the possible
alternatives and make the appropriate decisions.
4. Conclusions
It is clear from the results above that the discovery of
natural gas reserves in Cyprus and Israel can lead to
major changes in the power generation of the two
countries. Significant infrastructure investments will be
required for the transformation and export of natural gas
products. These gas discoveries will bring about major
economic benefits for the two countries. It is estimated
that the undiscounted total savings achieved by the two
countries during the whole projection period add up to
about 182 billion USD; the corresponding figure with a
discount rate of 10%1 reaches 24 billion USD. These
figures do not include the revenue for utilities from sales
of electricity within the local systems at a considerably
lower cost nor any other socioeconomic aspects, such as
the creation of jobs or the development of associated
industry. Based on the assumed commodity prices, our
results suggest that it is more profitable to export LNG
rather than electricity, despite the high investment and
operation costs of liquefaction plants. Similarly, the
current price difference between oil and natural gas
supports the prospect of petrochemical production.
The proven reserves of natural gas seem to be able to
support the infrastructure required for exports of
electricity, LNG or GTL products. Huge investments
will be required in the two countries for extraction,
installation of the electricity cable to mainland Europe,
construction of pipelines, LNG terminal or GTL plant.
One could expect that with the probable discovery of
further natural gas reserves, the viability of such major
projects, as well as the revenue from exports, will
undeniably increase. In a time of economic crisis, this
can act as an incentive for prompt decisions on a
political level.
In this paper we only addressed the internal demand
for power for the two countries. However, there is the
prospect that a substantial volume of the gas could go
into meeting demand for heat or transport. For instance,
in 2010 the residential sector in Cyprus consumed 84
ktonnes of oil [7], mainly for heating purposes, so
arguably there is potential for natural gas to replace this
fuel. Furthermore, in the Middle East and North Africa
consumption of gas has doubled from 1999 to 2010 and
its use in energy-intensive industries is expected to
continue to grow [28]. The possibility that a similar
situation will happen in Cyprus and Israel should not be
overlooked.
A proper assessment of external markets will be
needed as well. For instance, gas can be sold at a higher
price in South Korea and Japan than in Europe [2], but
the distances are obviously greater. Furthermore,
according to the European Union’s Energy Security and
Solidarity Action Plan, making full use of the union’s
indigenous energy sources and improving external
relations with fuel suppliers are two key aspects in
securing the EU’s energy future [29]. Therefore, it
could be argued that the EU itself could benefit from
exploitation of these gas reserves and should
encourage, if not actively participate in, the
construction of the necessary infastructure. Israel and
Cyprus may not have the reserves to develop into global
competitors in the gas market, but they can have an
influence on the European market, primarily in terms of
diversification of supply [30].
It should be noted that the model used has some
weaknesses. For instance, the option of importing
natural gas was not given to Cyprus. Of course, Cyprus
could import natural gas from Israel for the time being,
until Cyprus extracts its own natural gas, since they will
most likely cooperate in the exploitation of their
reserves. Another weakness of the model is the
exclusion of detailed transportation costing.
Nonetheless, this relatively small cost would not make
very big changes to the model results.
To sum up, a key objective of this paper was to
evaluate infrastructure development trends under certain
scenarios and how the natural gas reserves of the two
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1 A discount rate of 10% was selected to simulate a more competitive investment environment, in which there is relatively increased uncertainty regarding future
cash flows; this conservative approach was employed to assess the viability of the suggested course of actions in such unfavourable conditions.
countries can be used most efficiently. Since the
exploration and extraction processes are still in their
initial stages, figures regarding the reserves are expected
to change significantly in the near future, which means
the work conducted will need to be updated.
Furthermore, as more information becomes available,
there are other aspects that could be added in the model,
such as the use of natural gas in other sectors. This will
supply greater detail and give a more complete picture
of the potential effects of the gas reserves on the two
countries’ economies.
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Annex A - Reference Energy System
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Table B1: Transmission, distribution, regional, fuel import and fuel extraction technologies.
MESSAGE Variable Investment Ktonnes CO2/
Technology model code Efficiency cost ($/MWh) [2] cost ($/kW) MWyr [32] First year
Cyprus
Diesel Import CYDIES_IMP 1 167.2 a 2.186
Gas Extraction
for Electricity CYGAS_EXTR 1 3.42 b 1.581 2015
Heavy fuel Oil
Import CYOIL_IMP 1 62.3 c 2.186
Transmission ETrans 0.9825 [14]
Transmission
(bought electricity) ETrans2 0.9825 [14] 120.4 d
Distribution EDist 0.95 
Liquefaction EMGAS_LIQCY 0.95 [27] 6.84 b
(includes extraction) 928.9 [27] 2015
Israel
Diesel Import ISDIES_IMP 1 140.3 e 2.186
Coal Import ISCOA_IMP 1 15.5 f 3.099
Gas Import ISGAS_IMP 1 23.2 g 1.581
Heavy fuel oil Import ISOIL_IMP 1 82.1 h 2.186
Gas Extraction for
Electricity ISGAS_EXTR 1 3.42 b 1.581
Transmission ETransIS 0.98 [18]
Distribution EDistIS 0.977 [18]
Liquefaction EMGAS_LIQIS 0.95 [27] 6.84 b
(includes extraction) 928.9 [27] 2015
Regional
Israel to Cyprus
transmission IStoCYTrans 0.95 375 [15] 2015
Israel to Europe IStoEUviaCYtrans 0.95 375 [15] 2015
Cyprus to Europe
transmission CYtoEUTrans 0.95 375 [15] 2015
Europe transmission EUTrans 1 -120.4 d
Europe gas uptake EUGAS 1 -32.4 i
a Used OECD Europe Automotive diesel oil prices for commercial use in USD/toe for 2Q2011.
b Assumption based on [31].
c Used Germany Heavy fuel oil prices for electricity generation in USD/toe for 2Q2011, assuming similarities.
d Used Greece end-use Electricity prices for industry in USD/toe for 2Q2011.
e Used total OECD Automotive diesel oil prices for commercial use in USD/toe for 2Q2011.
f Used OECD import cost of steam coal for 2Q2011.
g Used Israel Natural gas prices for electricity generation in USD/toe for 2Q2011.
h Used Israel Heavy fuel oil prices for electricity generation in USD/toe for 2Q2011.
i Used EU average for LNG import prices into Europe in USD/Mbtu for summer 2011.
Annex B - Technology Input Data
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Table B3: Power plant installations in Israel.
Load/ 
MESSAGE Variable cost Plant life First Investment Historical capacity 
Technology model code Efficiency* ($/MWh)[33] (yrs) [33] year cost ($/kW) capacity [8]** factor
Existing oil steam units ISSUOILEX 0.3061 20 40 1980-428 0.144[8]
Existing gas steam units ISSUGASEX 0.3061 5.38 35 1990-1344 0.461[8]
Existing diesel jet gas
turbines ISJGTDESEX 0.22 24.25 40 1970-27 0.144[8]
1980-417
1990-60
Existing coal steam units ISSUCOAEX 0.3061 8.5 40 1990-1950 0.808[8]
2000-2340
2001-550
Existing gas industrial
gas turbines ISIGTGASEX 0.22 5.38 30 1990-420 0.461[8]
2000-1374
2007-234
2010-777
Existing diesel private
producers ISPRDESEX 0.22 24.25 40 2000-26 0.144[8]
2009-134
2010-58
Table B2: Power plant installations in Cyprus.
Historical Load/
Technology MESSAGE Variable cost Plant life First Investment capacity * capacity 
model code Efficiency [14] ($/MWh) [33] (yrs) [36] year cost ($/kW) (year-MW) [14] factor
Existing oil steam units CYSUOILEX 0.3061 20 50 1966-60 0.85 [33]
1976-120
1982-60
1993-300
2000-390
Existing wind farms CYWINDEX 1 25 25 2010-82
2011-51.5 0.2 [33,34]
Existing biogas CYBIOEX 1 2.65 30 2007-8 0.85 [33]
Existing diesel gas
turbines CYGTDESEX 0.2121 24.25 50 1993-75
1995-75
1999-38 0.85 [34]
Existing photovoltaics CYPVEX 1 50 25 2006-9.3 0.2 [33,34]
Existing diesel combined
cycle gas turbines CYCCGTDESEX 0.4689 24.25 40 2010-440 0.2 [33]
Potential concentrated
solar power CYCSP 1 27.5 25 2015 5500 [33,34] 0.3 [33,34]
Potential gas units CYGAS 0.4689 5 30 2015 1300 [33] 0.55 [33]
Potential biogas CYBIO 1 2.65 30 2550 [33,34] 0.85 [33]
Potential photovoltaics CYPV 1 50 25 5500 [33,34] 0.2 [33,34]
Potential oil units CYOIL 0.3604 20 40 1817 [33] 0.85 [33]
Potential diesel combined
cycle gas turbines CYCCGTDES 0.4689 24.25 40 461 [33] 0.85 [33]
Potential wind farms CYWIND 1 25 25 2000 [33,34] 0.2 [33,34]
Dummy plants CYDUMMY 1 11415 2 99999
* The values are approximate and correspond to the addition of capacity on the given year.
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Table B3: Power plant installations in Israel (Continued).
Load/ 
MESSAGE Variable cost Plant life First Investment Historical capacity 
Technology model code Efficiency* ($/MWh)[33] (yrs) [33] year cost ($/kW) capacity [8]** factor
Existing gas combined
cycle gas turbine ISCCGTGASEX 0.4689 5 30 2000-337 0.461[8]
2002-343
2003-315
2006-488
2007-142
2008-709
2009-465
Potential photovoltaics ISPV 1 50 25 5500[33,34] 0.2[33,34]
Potential biogas ISBIO 1 2.65 30 2550[33,34] 0.85[33]
Potential concentrated
solar power ISCSP 1 27.5 25 2015 5500[33,34] 0.3[33,34]
Potential wind farms ISWIND 1 25 25 2000[33,34] 0.2[33,34]
Potential oil units ISOIL 0.3604 20 40 1817[33] 0.144[8]
Potential diesel units ISDES 0.3 24.25 40 461[33] 0.144[8]
Potential coal units ISCOA 0.3604 8.5 40 3000[33] 0.808[8]
Potential gas units ISGAS 0.4689 5 30 1300[33] 0.461[8]
Dummy plants ISDUMMY 1 11415 2 99999
* Assumed same thermal efficiencies as the corresponding plants in Cyprus [14].
** The values are approximate and correspond to the addition of capacity on the given year.
Annex C - Selected scenario results
Table C1: Total exports from Cyprus and Israel in each scenario, throughout the projection period (2011–2050).
Cyprus Israel
Scenario LNG (GWh) Electricity (GWh) LNG (GWh) Electricity (GWh)
Baseline scenario 1 124 072 150 434 4 386 202 202 004
Additional cable 748 741 326 511 4 050 381 278 427
Higher LNG prices (+25%) 1 476 402 0 4 653 234 157 060
Higher LNG prices (+50%) 1 525 107 0 4 979 299 123 254
Higher LNG prices (+100%) 1 580 604 0 5 511 715 100 736
Higher LNG prices (+150%) 1 621 999 0 5 658 294 100 736
Higher electricity prices (+25%) 757 091 327 609 3 270 094 144 065
Higher electricity prices (+50%) 722 678 344 245 3 232 870 146 230
Higher electricity prices (+100%) 688 264 362 878 3 232 870 242 439
Higher electricity prices (+150%) 688 264 369 010 3 232 870 244 191
Table B4: GTL plant specifications.
Capacity Maximum Investment Operating Export 
(bbl/d) production (GWh) Efficiency[24] cost ($/kW)[20] cost ($/MWh)[35] Plant life (yrs) price ($/MWh)*
17 000 10 548 0.424 1694.4 4 30 63.1
* Used average price for crude oil during January-September of 2011 for IEA countries [2].
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Table C2: Fate of extracted natural gas in each scenario, throughout the projection period (2011–2050).
Cyprus Israel
Scenario Liquefaction Power generation Liquefaction Power
(GWh) (GWh) (GWh) generation (GWh)
Baseline scenario 1 183 234 923 739 4 617 055 3 810 847
Additional cable 788 148 1 318 825 4 263 559 4 164 342
Higher LNG prices (+25%) 1 554 107 552 866 4 898 141 3 529 759
Higher LNG prices (+50%) 1 605 376 501 597 5 241 367 3 186 533
Higher LNG prices (+100%) 1 663 793 443 179 5 801 805 2 626 094
Higher LNG prices (+150%) 1 707 367 399 606 5 956 099 2 471 800
Higher electricity prices (+25%) 796 938 1 310 035 3 442 204 4 985 697
Higher electricity prices (+50%) 760 713 1 346 259 3 403 021 5 024 878
Higher electricity prices (+100%) 724 489 1 382 484 3 403 021 5 024 875
Higher electricity prices (+150%) 724 489 1 382 484 3 403 021 5 024 875
Table C3: Total system savings with discount rate of 10%.
Scenario Savings (billion USD)
Baseline scenario 24.13
Additional cable 32.39
Higher LNG prices (+25%) 33.55
Higher LNG prices (+50%) 46.97
Higher LNG prices (+100%) 75.97
Higher LNG prices (+150%) 105.85
Higher electricity prices (+25%) 33.33
Higher electricity prices (+50%) 36.74
Higher electricity prices (+100%) 43.57
Higher electricity prices (+150%) 50.41
Petrochemical production 29.44

